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This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that education, as measured by the
average schooling years in the population aged 15 and above, reduces the likelihood
of societal con￿ icts in Africa. It focuses on a sample of 31 African countries during
1960-2000 and uses both panel ordered probit and multinomial logistic estimation
models. Using an aggregated measure of all intra-state major episodes of political vi-
olence obtained from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) as proxy for con￿ ict,
and controlling for the extent of political participation, income inequality, labour
market conditions, neighborhood e⁄ects, di⁄erent income levels, natural resource
revenues, youth bulge, in￿ ation, ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalisation and
urbanisation; the results suggests that education e⁄ectively reduces the likelihood
of intra-state con￿ icts in Africa. This ￿nding is robust to alternative model spec-
i￿cations and to alternative time frames of analysis. The evidence also suggests
that, sound macroeconomic policies, by way of rapid per capita GDP growth, bet-
ter export performance and lower in￿ ation are means of e⁄ectively reducing the
likelihood of con￿ icts while neighborhood e⁄ects are a signi￿cant driver of internal
con￿ icts in African states. Therefore, in the battle to reduce the frequency of intra-
state con￿ icts, African governments should complement investments in education
with sound macroeconomic policies while seeking mutually bene￿cial solutions to
all major internal con￿ icts, with a view to minimising their spill-over e⁄ects.
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11 Introduction
African, and in particular, sub-Saharan Africa￿ s economic growth performance over the
past few decades has disappointedly lagged behind that of other regions that were at
similar or even lower levels of economic progress in the 1960s. Concurrently with the
slow growth observed across most of Africa, has been the increasing prevalence of several
forms of violent con￿ ict on the continent and recent empirical evidence suggests a strong
correlation between socio-political con￿ icts and negative growth.1 Considering the large
number of on-going con￿ icts in Africa today, their devastating consequences and enormous
costs, it becomes imperative to ask not just how the damage can be repaired, but more
importantly, how future con￿ icts can be adverted or minimised.
The fact that increasing redistributive policies, notably through investments in school
education2 have not delivered on their promises of reducing violent forms of con￿ ict par-
ticularly in Africa raises further questions as to the two faces of education3 in con￿ ict.
The conventional belief in the civilizing power of education, as upheld in the UNESCO
Commission for Education for the 21st Century suggests that:
￿education (...) is one of the most important means of advancing the development
of the human race in an enhanced manner and with greater harmony. With its help,
poverty, exclusion, ignorance, repression and wars may be reduced￿
The World Bank has also unequivocally stressed its faith in the key signi￿cance of
education and lifelong learning in reinforcing social cohesion:
￿by improving people￿ s ability to function as members of their communities, ed-
ucation and training increase social cohesion, reduce crime and improve income
distribution￿ , World Bank (2002).
However, as the evidence suggests, this century-old myth that education plays a fun-
damental role in promoting inter-personal cooperation and understanding, in reinforcing
social cohesion, in dismantling social inequality and morally improving people, is fast be-
coming one of the most in￿ uential fallacies and self-delusions in education, Klaus (2004).
1For instance, Aryeetey & Fosu (2002:3) ￿nd that episodes of negative growth in Ghana tended
generally to coincide with periods of socio-political turmoil characterised by changes in government, and
policy changes or reversals.
2According to the United Nations Educational, Scienti￿c and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), most
SSA countries literally achieved universal primary education at the beginning of the twenty-￿rst century.
3I acknowledge a semantic debt to Bush & Saltarelli (2000).
2In a highly controversial paper, Bush & Saltarelli (2000:33) argue that ￿in many con￿icts
around the world, education is part of the problem, not the solution￿ . Citing a range of
factors from the uneven distribution of education and educational opportunities, the role
of education as a weapon in cultural repression, the denial of education as a weapon of
war, the manipulation of history for political purposes, the manipulation of textbooks,
ethnically segregated education to ensure inequality and prejudices to the incitation of
hatred for other ethnic groups through the conveying of images which assert the superior-
ity of the dominant culture or another group￿ s inferiority; Bush & Saltarelli (2000) a¢ rm
the destructive e⁄ects of education which exacerbate ethno-political con￿ icts.
Aguilar & Richmond (1998), on the other hand, citing the Rwandan genocide in 1994,
question the education received by the protagonists and the main perpetrators of the
massacre:
￿The role of well-educated persons in the conception, planning and execution of
the genocide requires explanation; any attempt at explanation must consider how it
was possible that their education did not render genocide unthinkable. The active
involvement of children and young people in carrying out acts of violence, sometimes
against their teachers and fellow pupils, raises further questions about the kind of
education they had received￿
The educational scientist, Davies Lynn (2004:3) has also alluded to the involvement
of well-educated persons in some of the worst atrocities of modern times, referring to
the generally outstanding education biographies of the assassins of the September 11th
terrorist attacks and the key personalities within Al Qaeda movement.
Even more embarrassing has been the fact that recent empirical evidence seems to
suggest a negative statistically signi￿cant relationship between growth in educational
outcomes and economic growth4 in sub-Saharan Africa, thus raising the question as to
whether educational outcomes and con￿ ict are not related in a manner that might be
detrimental to economic growth in Africa.
4Several empirical studies, notably, Pritchett (2001); Benhabib & Spiegel (1994), Spiegel (1994), and
Lau et. al. (1991) in Pritchett (2001) have found a negative impact of schooling growth on economic
growth. Pritchett (2001), for instance, ￿nds a strong negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient on
schooling growth in the growth regressions and his results are robust to the choice of sample, estimation
technique, the presence of outliers and to alternative measures of education. As Pritchett (2001:20) argues,
SSA, contrary to intuition, did accumulate a great deal of educational capital over the ￿rst three decades
following 1960. However, this increased education does not appear to have paid o⁄ in aggregate growth
due to rent-seeking and talent diversion caused by excessive and ine⁄ective government interventions in
the economy.
31.1 Problem Statement
Until recently, the conventional wisdom has been that education is a powerful weapon
for peace by reducing the likelihood of violent societal con￿ ict, enhancing social cohe-
sion, reducing inequalities, improving mutual understanding and the respect for diversity.
However, in spite of several decades of massive investments in education by governments
all over the world, widespread forms of violent con￿ icts have persisted, which questions
the ￿civilizing￿role of education in con￿ ict.
A number of studies, notably, Bush & Saltarelli (2000), Smith & Vaux (2003), Vriens
(2003), Davies (2010, 2004), Sommers (2002), Boyden & Ryder (1996), Huntington (1968),
Apter (1955), Foster (1965), McWilliam & Kwamena-Poh (1978), Lange (2003), Obura
(2002), Bourguignon & Verdier (2005), and Fedderke & Kuluratne (2008), amongst oth-
ers, have attempted theoretical justi￿cations as to why education could be an important
source, as well as, a mitigator of societal con￿ ict.
The ￿ve channels widely acknowledged in the literature as the fundamental mecha-
nisms through which education potentially compromises social peace are (1) rising polit-
ical aspirations of the recipients of education (see notably, Foster (1965), McWilliam &
Kwamena-Poh (1978), Bourguignon & Verdier (2005) and Fedderke & Kularatne (2008));
(2) rising socio-economic inequalities and individualism or intolerance (see notably, Davies
(2004) and Vriens (2003)); (3) extreme ethnic diversity5 (see notably, Bush & Saltarelli
(2000) and Smith & Vaux (2003)); (4) mis-match between education and jobs (see no-
tably, Boyden & Ryder (1996), Apter (1955), and Lange (2003)) and (5) the inherently
violent nature of certain type of educational curricula (see notably, Davies (2004), and
Sommers (2002)).
A rather extreme view of the link between education and con￿ ict holds that con￿ icts
are an o⁄-shoot of every modernisation process in society. According to this view, societies
exposed to modernisation processes are ultimately in a permanent state of con￿ ict with
themselves, (see notably, Huntington (1968), and Senghaas (1998)). Huntington (1968:5),
for instance, argues that:
"Social and economic change...extends political consciousness, multiply political
demands, broaden political participation...These changes undermine traditional
sources of political authority and traditional political institutions...The result are
political instability and disorder...".
5According to these two authors, education is a key medium through which ethnicity may be mobilized
to incite con￿ icts.
4Senghaas (1998), also argues that education is capable of unleashing and multiplying
con￿ icts:
￿Development (...) is inevitably con￿ ictual, destabilizing and subversive because
it challenges the established power structures that prevent individuals and groups
from reaching their full potential￿
Whilst signi￿cant attempts have so far been made at understanding the dynamics
leading to violent con￿ ict (or the drivers), and quite a number of other attempts have
examined the theoretical arguments linking con￿ ict to education,6 none of the previous
studies, to the best of my knowledge, have expressly tested the e⁄ects of schooling edu-
cation on con￿ ict, at least not in the context of Africa.
1.2 Objectives of the Study
The foremost objective of this study thus, is to investigate the impact of schooling ed-
ucation on the likelihood of con￿ icts in Africa. An empirical exploration of the nature
of the relationship between schooling education and con￿ ict is of the upmost importance
today, not only in Africa, but also for the world at large, given the multiplicity of violent
con￿ icts, often instigated by highly educated individuals. Thus, the ￿ndings of the study
carry important implications for policy, especially as a growing consensus in the devel-
opment literature sees investment in human capital as primordial, not only to speeding
growth and poverty alleviation but also to con￿ ict mitigation.
The study focuses on a sample of 31 African countries during 1960-2000 and uses both
panel ordered probit and multinomial logistic estimation models. Using an aggregated
measure of all intra-state major episodes of political violence obtained from the Political
Instability Task Force (PITF) as proxy for con￿ ict, and controlling for the extent of po-
litical participation, income inequality, labour market conditions, neighborhood e⁄ects,
di⁄erent income levels, natural resource revenues, youth bulge, in￿ ation, ethno-linguistic
and religious fractionalisation and urbanisation; the results suggests that education ef-
fectively reduces the likelihood of intra-state con￿ icts in Africa. This ￿nding is robust
to alternative model speci￿cations and to alternative time frames of analysis. The evi-
dence also suggests that, sound macroeconomic policies, by way of rapid per capita GDP
growth, better export performance and lower in￿ ation are means of e⁄ectively reducing
6A few others more have investigated the repercussions of con￿ ict on educational outcomes in con￿ ict
regions. See for instance, Sany (2010), and Keleher (2006).
5the likelihood of con￿ icts while neighborhood e⁄ects are a signi￿cant driver of internal
con￿ icts in African states. Therefore, in the battle to reduce the frequency of intra-state
con￿ icts, African governments should complement investments in education with sound
macroeconomic policies while seeking mutually bene￿cial solutions to all major internal
con￿ icts, with a view to minimising their spill-over e⁄ects.
However, some of the limitations of the study are worth mentioning here. Due to data
constraints, the study limits itself to the period between 1960-2000 and only countries for
which con￿ ict data is available for that time period were included in the study. While
failing to incorporate recent con￿ ict episodes, there is also the possibility of a sample
selection bias creeping into the results. Further, as stated above, this is a study of the
association between schooling education and the likelihood of intra-state (domestic or in-
ternal) con￿ ict in Africa - the study thus abstracts from the intensity of con￿ icts. Finally,
the study does not explore the likely transmission mechanisms between education and
con￿ ict.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: - section two provides a brief review of
the existing literature while section three outlines the methodology of the study. Section
four discusses the results and some robustness checks while section ￿ve concludes.
2 Brief Literature Review
Two main opposing schools of thought on the association between con￿ ict and education
can be identi￿ed in the literature, namely: - the social stability and political aspirations
schools. The social stability school, whose main proponent is Acemoglu & Robinson
(2001), holds that resource transfers or redistribution from so-called ￿ elites￿to the disad-
vantaged represent an attempt to purchase social stability which is a necessary condition
for sustainable economic growth. According to this view, educating the poor is a way
of raising their opportunity cost of con￿ ict, suggesting that human capital transfers and
con￿ ict are inversely related. A central feature of the Acemoglu & Robinson (2001) model
(henceforth, A & R Model) is the degree of income inequality which is positively corre-
lated with political instability. The A & R Model also predicts that redistribution to the
poor will be highest at more moderate levels of inequality, and lowest at higher or lower
levels of inequality. According to the A & R framework, the rising episodes of con￿ icts in
Africa post-independence would be attributable to rising levels of inequality and declining
costs of repression. However, a closer look at the evidence suggests the contrary. Indeed,
6the broad social science literature agrees that most forms of horizontal inequalities have
been minimised by successive African governments since independence, see for instance,
Arnim et al (2007) and Langer (2007), implying paradoxically, that con￿ icts should have
reduced on the continent.
On the other hand, the aspirations school of thought, whose proponents are mainly
recruited from the social science literature, notably, Huntington (1968), Apter (1955),
Foster (1965), McWilliam & Kwamena-Poh (1978), Bourguignon & Verdier (2005) and
recently, Fedderke & Kularatne (2008); holds that human capital empowerment of the
disadvantaged in society raises their political aspirations to power, hence e⁄ectively low-
ering, not raising, the opportunity costs of con￿ ict of the disadvantaged as postulated by
the social stability proponents.
Apter (1955), Foster (1965), and McWilliam & Kwamena-Poh (1978), all argue that
the genesis of post-war nationalism which often resulted in wars of independence against
the colonisers is to be traced back to the unanticipated consequence of educational trans-
fers from the colonisers to the indigenous elites of the former colonies. Bourguignon &
Verdier (2005) explore the political economy of education and development using trade
liberalisation and integration of international factor markets as motivations for the trans-
fer of human capital by the elite to the disadvantaged of society. In this framework, the
political elite will transfer human capital to the disadvantaged on grounds of raising the
latter￿ s productivity, but this comes at the expense of the latter gaining access to po-
litical power. The weakness of the Bourguignon & Verdier framework in characterising
con￿ ict situations is that political rights are not usually realised immediately following
human capital transfers to the disadvantaged. It would seem plausible to believe that hu-
man capital transfers instead raises the consciousness of the disadvantaged about political
rights, rather than consolidating such rights. Furthermore, it can be argued that the per-
sistent delay in granting those rights might be the fuel that sustains political instability
and unrest in a country.
Building on the Bourguignon & Verdier (2005) framework, Fedderke & Kularatne
(2008) outline a model, based on the two contrasting case studies of South Africa and Sri
Lanka, which supports the thesis of a necessary trade-o⁄ between the productivity gains
for society and rising political aspirations of the poor associated with human capital
transfers to them by the elite, thus con￿rming the hypothesis of concavity of human
capital transfers in con￿ ict.
Besides these two contrasting schools of thought, a number of theoretical as well as
7empirical studies have examined circumstances under which economic motivations (or
better still, grievances) might led to violent political actions. In a model characterising
the con￿ ict that led to the withdrawal of metropolitan powers from empires, Grossman
& Iyigun7(1997), consider the e⁄ect of population increase on the allocation of time by
the indigenous population between productive and subversive activities - suggesting that
the rapid increase in population during the colonial period increased the potential private
returns to subversive activity until the colonies became a net burden on the metropolitan
governments. Cramer (2005), on the other hand, argues that in conditions of economic
deprivation and especially when agents greatly discount the future, the opportunity cost
of con￿ ict is relatively lower. Bates (1981:30) echoes a view already buttressed by Hunt-
ington (1968), that it was the combination of worldwide in￿ ation and the resistance of
colonial ￿rms and governments to claims for o⁄-setting wage increases that sparked wide-
spread protests amongst urban consumers, thus giving impetus to nationalist activism
that led to the political transition in the Gold Coast in 1957.8 Bates (1983) model of con-
￿ ict, building on Bates & Lofchie (1980), analyses the link between distortion in the rural
traditional economic system, due to attempts at introducing an urban-based exchange
economy in colonial Africa, and rising anti-colonialist sentiments that lead to the end of
colonial rule.
In Hirshleifer￿ s (1995) model of anarchy, the persistence of con￿ ict is justi￿ed by the
fact that neither of the belligerent parties has a superior ￿ghting technology and the
model essentially predicts two scenarios under which con￿ ict rises - as agents devise more
decisive ￿ghting technologies and as the number of contestants in the con￿ ict rises. Hirsh-
leifer￿ s model can serve to characterise some forms of con￿ ict that have occurred in Africa
considering that, more knowledge acquired from schooling means a better technology of
￿ghting and an ever-increasing number of unemployed youths implies an increased num-
ber of potential belligerents. However, the shortcomings of Hirshleifer￿ s model are that,
the model does not explain why agents may opt to redistribute resources to their enemies
and secondly, why transition is hardly a case of complete victory of one of the belligerent
groups but instead, a continuity of con￿ ict in other forms.
Unlike the Hirshleifer model, the Galor & Moav (2004) model predicts that class
con￿ ict would be eliminated as a result of the transfer of human capital from the elite
7Building on Grossman & Iyigun (1995).
8However, Foster (1965:118) notes a high correlation between urbanisation and education in the Gold
Coast during the colonial era, suggesting that the roots of nationalism are to be found instead in educa-
tional transfers from the coloniser.
8to the poor, because of the complimentarity between physical and human capital. In the
Bates et al (2007) model, violence, if e¢ ciently organised enhances social welfare and
productivity in both state and stateless societies. This model, basically an extension of
Hirshleifer￿ s model, determines conditions under which a state can become predatory or
developmental.
Yet another framework for understanding con￿ ict that has been discussed in the lit-
erature is found in the work of Collier et al (2006). Their empirical study reveals that
societal con￿ ict is driven by the following factors ￿the level of per capita income, the
presence of natural resources, population size, the degree of fractionalization, the fact that
a country has been a French colony, youth bulges, and the proportion of the country that
is mountainous.
3 Methodology
This section describes the empirical model, the estimator, the estimation strategy and
also presents the variables and datasets used in the study.
3.1 Empirical Model
The question that this paper seeks to address is whether increasing school education, as
measured by the average years of schooling in the population aged 15 and above, reduces
the likelihood of societal con￿ icts in Africa?
To answer this question, the regression model is speci￿ed as follows:
CIV TOTit = ￿AY Sit + ￿Xit + ￿i + "it (1)
where
- CIV TOTit is an aggregate measure9 of the frequency of all intra-state major episodes
of political violence during 1960-2000.
- AY Sit is the principal explanatory variable - the average years of schooling in the
population aged 15 and above during 1960-2000.
- Xit is the matrix of country-year control variables that are standard in the con￿ ict
literature, notably, the extent of political participation, a measure of income inequality,
income levels, an indicator of labour market conditions, urbanisation, the share of natural
9This aggregate measure makes no distinction between "civil" and "ethnic" con￿ ict, as long as both
are intra-state.
9resources export in GDP, the proportion of young men aged between 15-24 in the total
population (youth bulge), ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalisation, neighborhood
e⁄ects, and in￿ ation.
- ￿ is a vector of slope coe¢ cients that are common to all countries.
- ￿i is a vector of individual country e⁄ects re￿ ecting unobservable country hetero-
geneity and
- "it is a vector of error terms.
3.2 Choice of Estimator
The analysis on the empirical model speci￿ed in equation (1) above is performed using
a core dataset of thirty-one (31) African countries during 1960-2000. The dependent
variable (CIVTOT), captures the occurrence or not of intra-state con￿ ict in a country in
a particular year. Thus, CIVTOT=1 implies there was an episode of intra-state con￿ ict
in the country in that particular year and otherwise, CIVTOT=0. The ideal estimator for
estimating this type of models in which the dependent variable is binary and discontinuous,
is the random-e⁄ects logistic or probit model. The multinomial logistic model, which gives
similar estimates to the random-e⁄ects logistic model is most preferable because it best
handles the problem of distribution of the error term, while paying less attention to
ordering or threshold values.
The data on con￿ ict (or Major Episodes of Political Violence - MEPV) is obtained
from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) which assigns eleven (11) intensity levels
or magnitudes ranging from 0 (no con￿ ict) through 1 (lowest intensity) to 10 (highest in-
tensity). Magnitude scores, as coded by the PITF, re￿ ect multiple factors including state
capabilities, interactive intensity (means and goals), area and scope of death and destruc-
tion, population displacement, and episode duration. Magnitude scores are considered to
be consistently assigned (i.e. comparable) across episode types and for all states directly
involved.
However, in this paper, only two de￿nitions or codes are assigned to the con￿ ict vari-
able (CIVTOT), that is, the occurrence of intra-state con￿ ict in a country in a particular
year (CIVTOT=1) or not (CIVTOT=0). Where no data is available, con￿ ict is recorded




it = Xit￿ + ￿i + "it = Zit + "it; "it ￿Xi ~ ￿(0;1); t = 1;::::;T (2)
10where Xit captures the explanatory variables indicated above, "it are independent and
identically distributed random variables, ￿i is the individual country e⁄ects and ￿ is the
￿xed or common parameters identical to all countries. The observed indicator variable
Yit is determined from Y ￿
it; the latent variable using the following mechanism:
Yit =
(
0 if Y ￿
it < ￿1




In this ordered speci￿cation, Y ￿ has a single threshold point, hence, the observed
variable Y depends on whether or not the threshold point has been crossed.
3.3 Estimation Strategy
In the ￿rst instance, annual data for all variables included in the model is utilised in
running a baseline random-e⁄ects probit model on equation (1) speci￿ed above and in
subsequently running a multinomial logistic model for the same speci￿cation. The mar-
ginal probabilities of observing a particular con￿ ict outcome for the multinomial logistic
model are then computed. As test for robustness of the results, the same estimation
strategy is followed but this time using ￿ve-year period averages of all variables in the
model.
However, a number of econometric problems are associated with the estimation of
equation (1) above. These relate to possible endogeneity, multicollinearity of variables,
and heteroskedasticity of residuals.
To handle the likely problem of endogeneity arising from the fact that (1) some of the
explanatory variables might be correlated with the un-observed country e⁄ects, (2) there
might be persistence in the dependent variable and (3) some omitted variables might
concurrently a⁄ect the dependent variable as well as some of the explanatory variables,
and following the evidence suggested by Arellano & Carrasco (2003) on dealing with
endogeneity in discrete-choice panel data models, I instrument the possible endogenous
variables by their ￿rst lagged values. In addition to taking the ￿rst lagged values of
all potentially endogenous variables, I attempt to di⁄erentiate the impact of di⁄erent
economic environments on educational outcomes by including a dummy for the income
level or development of a country. Also, in order to handle the issue of persistence in the
dependent variable, I estimate a dynamic model wherein the lagged value of the dependent
variable is included as one of the explanatory variables.
To deal with heteroscedasticity of residuals, I use robust standard errors. Regarding
11the distribution of the error term, the standard approach in the literature is to spec-
ify additional models that do not emphasise ordering or threshold values (as robustness
checks), such as the multinomial logit and binary logit models. Therefore, as robustness,
I estimate a multinomial logit model to handle the issue of heteroscedasticity. To check
for possible multicollinearity on explanatory variables, I examine the matrix of correlation
coe¢ cients.
3.4 Variables and Data
The dependent variable in all speci￿cations, CIVTOT, is an aggregated measure of all
intra-state major episodes of political violence, whether they be civil or ethnic violence,
obtained from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) dataset.10 The intuition for
using an aggregated measure is precisely because of the di¢ culty in distinguishing episodes
of civil violence from those of ethnic violence. According to the PITF dataset, con￿ ict
is deemed to occur when an organised group challenges the government, with or without
fatalities. It de￿nes eleven (11) con￿ ict intensity levels or magnitudes ranging from 0 (no
con￿ ict) through 1 (lowest intensity) to 10 (highest intensity). Magnitude scores, as coded
by the PITF, re￿ ect multiple factors including state capabilities, interactive intensity
(means and goals), area and scope of death and destruction, population displacement,
and episode duration. Magnitude scores are considered to be consistently assigned (i.e.
comparable) across episode types and for all states directly involved.
However, the present study abstracts from the intensity of con￿ icts in each particular
year and only focuses on the occurrence or not of an episode of intra-state con￿ ict in a
country in a particular year. Thus, when using annualised data, CIVTOT is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 in event of the occurrence of intra-state con￿ ict in a country
in a particular year and the value 0 otherwise. Where no data is available, the space is
left blank.
When using ￿ve-year period averages, CIVTOT instead captures the frequency of
intra-state con￿ icts during each ￿ve-year period. The frequency of con￿ icts in each ￿ve-
year period during 1960-2000 is obtained as the proportion of years in each observed
￿ve-year period during which an episode of intra-state con￿ ict occurred. Thus, CIVTOT
would take on any of the following possible values:
10A few studies, notably, Bleaney & Dimico (2010) have also utilised the PITF dataset and in particular,
they also ignored the distinction between civil and ethnic con￿ ict.
12CIV TOT =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
0 if there was conflict in none of the years during the 5 year period
0:2 if there was conflict in only one of the years during the 5 year period
0:4 if there was conflict in only two of the years during the 5 year period
0:6 if there was conflict in only three of the years during the 5 year period
0:8 if there was conflict in only four of the years during the 5 year period
1 if there was conflict in all five of the years during the 5 year period
9
> > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > ;
In sum, CIVTOT takes on six possible values f0;0:2;0:4;0:6;0:8;1g representing di⁄erent
con￿ ict frequencies during each ￿ve-year period interval over the 1960-2000 timespan.
The principal explantory variable is the average years of schooling in the population
aged 15 and above (AYS) obtained from Barro & Lee educational attainments datasets.
Informed by the con￿ ict literature, the study uses annualised (or correspondingly, ￿ve-
year period averages) of a set of twelve (12) control variables spanning through the time
period 1960-2000. These include:
- Export share in GDP (EXP) to capture the likely in￿ uence of primary commodity
revenues on the risks of con￿ ict in a country. This data is obtained from the World Bank.
The study uses the export share in GDP to capture the presence of natural resources
due to the lack of disaggregated data on natural resource exports for almost all countries
in the sample. On another count, since a signi￿cant share of export revenues in most
African countries comes from natural resources, the export share in GDP would seem a
suitable proxy for this channel. The literature identi￿es three channels through which
primary commodity revenues might raise the risks of con￿ ict: - through the ￿nancing of
rebel predation during con￿ icts11, through the incentives to capture rents (greed) both
during and after the con￿ ict, and through grievances by the general population arising
from possible neglect by governments of resource-rich countries. The empirical evidence
by Collier et al (2006) suggests a quadratic relationship between natural resources and
con￿ ict - with the sign of primary commodity exports (PCE) being positive and signi￿cant,
while the sign on PCE squared is negative and signi￿cant.
- Ethno-linguistic and Religious Fractionalisation (ETHNOREL) to control for the
impact of ethno-linguistic and religious cleavages on the propensity of con￿ icts. Collier &
Hoe› er (1998 & 2004), and Fearon & Laitin (2003) suggests no evidence that ethnicity
11Examples of such include the diamond-￿nanced rebellions in Sierra Leone and Angola, Collier et al
(2006).
13diversity makes con￿ icts more likely to start, although Collier et al (2006) found a positive
signi￿cant relationship between ethno-linguistic & religious fractionalisation and con￿ icts.
Smith (2005:376) argues that identity-based di⁄erences are important for understanding
con￿ ict, more because they may be mobilised to escalate con￿ ict, rather than them being
fundamental causes. The expected sign on this variable is thus indeterminate.
- Youth bulge (YBULGE): is used to control for the propensity of con￿ ict arising
from a signi￿cant presence of "rascals", that is, young men between the ages of 15-24,
in the total population. The data is obtained from Collier et al (2006) whose empirical
results suggest a positive signi￿cant relationship between youth bulge and the propensity
of con￿ ict. This is explained by the fact that a great availability of potential recruits as
rebel soldiers makes it easier and cheaper to start a rebellion.
- Urbanisation (URBAN): To control for the e⁄ects of rising urbanisation on the
propensity of con￿ ict, the share of the urban population in the total population is included.
Bates (1981) has shown that rising urbanisation is a chief source of con￿ ict in Africa, as
it produces a pool of unemployed people who easily become rebel recruits.12 However,
Collier and Hoe› er (2004) ￿nd a positive link between urbanisation and political stability,
working through enhanced productivity and growth. As such, the sign on this variable is
imprecise.
- In￿ation (INFL): One of the frequent causes of urban uprising in Africa, as Bates
(1981) argues, is rising in￿ ation. During in￿ ationary situations, the opportunity cost of
con￿ ict is lower. Hence, a positive sign is expected on the in￿ ation variable.
- Growth in per capita GDP (GROW): There is a consensus in the literature that
faster growth in per capita incomes reduces the risks of con￿ ict by tightening the labour
market, thus making it more di¢ cult for rebel militia organisations to recruit. GROW
is utilised in the models as a proxy for labour market conditions. During periods of fast
growth (assumed to be above the normal growth rate of the economy), it is expected
that unemployment would be lower, and hence the lesser the frequency of unemployment-
related con￿ icts. There is therefore an expectation of a negative sign on this variable.
- Level of per capita GDP (PCGDP): This variable aims to capture the e⁄ects of
the per capita income level of a country on the frequency of con￿ icts. According to
the evidence by Krueger & Maleckova (2003:121), individuals tend to engage in property
crimes if they have lower wages or less education13 but the occurrence of violent crimes,
12Auvinen (1997) and Annett (2001) also ￿nd a negative relationship between urbanisation and stability.
13See for instance, Ehrlich (1973), Freeman (1996), & Piehl (1998).
14including murders, is typically found to be unrelated to economic opportunities.14 Also,
rational choice models of con￿ ict (notably, terrorism) fail to give an unambiguous answer
to the question of whether higher income and more education reduces participation in
violent con￿ ict. Krueger & Maleckova (2003) conclude that "any connection between
poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak". As
such, the expected sign on this variable is ambiguous.
- Income inequality (GINI): to capture the e⁄ects of income inequality on the likelihood
of con￿ ict escalating. The political economy literature recognises the existence of vertical
inequalities, notably, high and sustained di⁄erences in income and wealth between the rich
and the poor, as a potential source of societal con￿ ict, whence the need for redistributive
policies as a way of purchasing social peace. The expectation thus, is that a higher gini
coe¢ cient increases the likelihood of con￿ icts.
- Extent of Political Participation (DEMOC): This variable, obtained from the Africa
Research Program dataset, captures the extent to which non-elites are able to access
institutional structures of political expression. Several authors, notably, Du¢ eld (2001),
have postulated that the prevalence of con￿ ict today is related more to issues of political
transformation and globalisation than to persistent poverty. The lack of political space
might raise frustrations amongst segments of the population leading to violent socio-
political unrest, as observed recently in the Arab world. The expectation thus, is for a
positive sign on the variable.
- Neighborhood E⁄ects (SPILL): It is arguable that internal con￿ icts occurring in one
country can be the source of con￿ icts in neighboring countries. To capture these neighbor-
hood e⁄ects, a variable coded named SPILL, is constructed to take into account whether
or not there was an episode of intra-state con￿ ict in any of the immediate surrounding
neighboring countries (or correspondingly, the number of years in each ￿ve-year period,
whereby there was con￿ ict in any of the immediate surrounding neighboring countries).15
If indeed spillover e⁄ects do matter, then the expectation is for a positive sign on this
variable.
- Di⁄erences in Economic Environments (DEV_DUMMY): is a dummy variable that
takes on the value 1 for countries with an overall per capita income level during 1960-2000
above the mean for all countries in the sample (i.e. above US$509) and the value 0 other-
wise. The ten countries for which DEV_DUMMY = 1 include Algeria, Botswana, Swazi-
14See for instance, Piehl (1998) & Ruhm (2000).
15By immediate neighboring countries, the study refers to those countries that share a border with the
country under investigation.
15Table 1: Variable List and Sources
VARIABLE SOURCE
Average Years of Schooling in Population aged 15 + (AYS) Barro & Lee
Intra-state Episodes of Con￿ ict (CIVTOT) Author￿ s Construction
from PITF Dataset
Export share in GDP (EXP) World Bank
Proportion of young men aged 15-24 in total population (YBULGE) Collier et al (2006)
Extent of Political Participation (DEMOC) Africa Research Program
Urbanisation (URBAN) World Bank
In￿ ation (INFL) World Bank
Ethno-linguistic & Religious Fractionalisation (ETHNOREL) Collier et al (2006)
Economic Environment (DEV_DUMMY) Author￿ s Construction
Resource Dummy (RES_DUMMY) Author￿ s Construction
Per capita GDP Growth (GROW) World Bank
Level of Per Capita GDP (PCGDP) World Bank
Neighborhood E⁄ects (SPILL) Author￿ s Construction
Extent of Income Inequality (GINI) World Inequality Dataset
16Table 2: Summary Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CIVTOT 236 0.203 0.355 0 1
GROW 235 4.355 7.462 -26.324 27.613
AYS 238 2.121 1.480 0.16 8.07
ETHNOREL 248 0.295 0.192 0 0.65
YBULGE 248 18.934 0.966 15.62 21.93
DEMOC 203 -1.372 10.013 -70.2 5
URBAN 248 26.013 16.160 2.08 76.2
INFL 175 54.313 485.410 0.077 6424.9
EXP 224 26.985 15.508 4.305 73.655
SPILL 248 1.838 1.744 0 7
PCGDP 235 501.09 646.28 41.51 3708.5
GINI 240 45.731 9.527 29.486 73.3
17Table 3: Matrix of Correlation Coe¢ cients
CIVTOT GROW AYS DEMOC URBAN INFL EXP YBULGE GINI SPILL PCGDP
CIVTOT 1.000
GROW -0.267 1.000
AYS -0.067 -0.089 1.000
DEMOC -0.324 0.307 0.030 1.000
URBAN -0.177 -0.123 0.504 0.102 1.000
INFL 0.094 -0.132 0.031 -0.084 -0.003 1.000
EXP -0.355 0.159 0.436 0.262 0.355 -0.043 1.000
YBULGE 0.122 -0.062 0.516 0.032 0.207 -0.037 0.111 1.000
SPILL 0.435 -0.238 0.015 -0.204 -0.212 0.136 -0.204 0.137 -0.133 1.000
GINI 0.033 -0.039 0.536 0.065 0.417 -0.041 0.242 0.279 1.000 -0.133
PCGDP -0.022 -0.021 0.689 0.069 0.658 -0.057 0.444 0.440 0.617 -0.142 1.000
Table 4: List of Countries included in Sample (Total: 31)
Algeria Congo Rep Sierra Leone Burundi Kenya
Benin Mali Sudan Rwanda Lesotho
Botswana Mauritius Swaziland Mozambique Togo
Gambia Mauritania Uganda Ethiopia
Ghana Malawi Zambia Libya
Cameroon Niger Zimbabwe South Africa
Central African Rep Senegal Zaire Tunisia
18land, Mauritania, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Libya, South Africa, and Tunisia. As
mentioned in the introductory section, it is plausible that educational outcomes and by
implication, the consequences of education on con￿ ict, might vary with di⁄erent economic
environments, thus the need to control for this in￿ uence.
- Resource Dummy (RES_DUMMY): This dummy variable which takes on the value
1 for the presence of oil or mineral deposits in a country, seeks to capture the speci￿c
in￿ uence of the "resource curse" on the likelihood of con￿ ict in a country. A positive
statistically signi￿cant sign on this variable suggests that countries with oil or mineral
deposits are more prone to con￿ icts than those without such resources.
Table 1 above summarises the variables included in the study, while Table 2 provides
summary descriptive statistics. Table 3 presents the matrix of correlation coe¢ cients
while Table 4 provides the list of countries included in the sample.
4 Discussion of the Results
Table 5 presents the results from di⁄erent speci￿cations of the random-e⁄ects probit model
and the multinomial logistic model on equation (1) above using di⁄erent time frames of
analysis - annualised data for Models 1 & 2 and ￿ve-year period averages for Models 3 &
4.
The results of the panel probit models using annualised data (Model 1) and ￿ve-
year period averages (Model 3) both suggest that increasing years of schooling e⁄ectively
reduces the likelihood of con￿ ict in Africa. Estimating the multinomial logistic model16
across di⁄erent time frames of analysis, as robustness check in Models 2 & 4 also con￿rms
this result - that education reduces the likelihood of con￿ ict in Africa.
The results of the panel probit model in Model 1, show that the following variables
enter with a positive statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient - In￿ ation (at 10%), neighborhood
e⁄ects (1%), con￿ ict in previous period (1%) and per capita income level (1%), which
suggests that, the main drivers of con￿ ict are rising in￿ ation and neighborhood e⁄ects,
while con￿ ict generally tends to have a persistent e⁄ect in Africa. The ￿nding that per
capita income levels are positively correlated with the likelihood of con￿ ict in Africa is
quite interesting but only by considering the impact of income levels in di⁄erent economic
environments (DEV_DUMMY) can one really appreciate the full import of this result.
16Only the marginal probabilities of the con￿ ict outcome CIVTOT = 1 are reported in Models 2 & 4
of Table 5, the marginal probabilities of CIVTOT = f0:2;0:4;0:6;&0:8g are not reported due to space
constraints. The base outcome for all marginal probabilities is CIVTOT = 0.
19Table 5: Main Results
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FREQUENCY OF CONFLICTS (CIVTOT)
Annual Data Five-Year Period Averages
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Probit Model Multinomial Logit Probit Model Multinomial Logit
AYS(t-1) -0.207** -0.382** -0.282** -2.646**
(0.164) (0.181) (0.140) (1.077)
YBULGE 0.053 0.123 -0.016 0.374
(0.095) (0.185) (0.117) (0.967)
DEMOC(t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.023
(0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.085)
URBAN -0.002 -0.008 -0.015 -0.051
(0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.072)
INFL(t-1) 0.001* 0.002** 0.007 0.035
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.027)
GROW(t-1) -0.006 0.013 0.004 -0.133*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.019) (0.075)
PCGDP(t-1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
ETHNOREL 0.533 0.971 -0.474 4.630
(0.456) (0.871) (0.769) (4.243)
GINI 0.006 0.015 -0.006 -0.155
(0.009) (0.017) (0.018) (0.101)
EXP(t-1) -0.052** -0.105** 0.033 0.681
(0.021) (0.041) (0.048) (0.448)
EXP2(t-1) 0.000* 0.001* -0.001 -0.022**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011)
SPILL 0.819** 2.045** 0.385*** 1.278***
(0.364) (0.897) (0.079) (0.367)
DEV_DUMMY -0.419 -0.906 -0.456 -14.834
(0.354) (0.653) (0.398) (9.325)
RES_DUMMY 0.131 0.307 0.447 2.695
(0.288) (0.637) (0.440) (1.796)
CIVTOT(t-1) 2.235*** 3.895*** 1.199*** 2.015
(0.164) (0.316) (0.426) (2.188)
CONSTANT -5.913 -10.879
(3.754) (17.411)
No. Obs. 695 695 130 130
Wald Chi2(15) 286.06 200.70 78.93
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.59 0.60 0.26 0.51
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Base outcome is Pr(CIVTOT=0)
20Accordingly, the sign on DEV_DUMMY is negative (and insigni￿cant) throughout all
four model speci￿cations, suggesting that higher income countries are less prone to con￿ ict
than lower income countries. If anything, the joint interpretation of the coe¢ cients on
PCGDP and DEV_DUMMY implies that rising per capita income raises the likelihood
of con￿ ict only for the low income countries that are included in the sample.
The results in Model 1 also suggests that better export performance contributes in
reducing the likelihood of con￿ ict in Africa, which goes contrary to the ￿ndings of Collier
et al (2006) who ￿nd concavity in the relationship between natural resource exports
and con￿ ict. Finally, although statistically insigni￿cant, the following variables enter
Model 1 with their correct signs - growth in per capita incomes, youth bulges, political
participation, ethno-linguistic & religious fractionalisation, income inequality and resource
dummy.
The results in Model 2 which employs the multinomial logistic estimation basically
validates the previous results in Model 1.
Changing the time frame of analysis from annualised data to ￿ve-year period averages,
and estimating the panel probit model (Model 3) and multinomial logistic model (Model
4) leaves the main ￿ndings of Models 1 & 2 unchanged, with the only exception that,
growth of per capita income is now statistically signi￿cant while in￿ ation and previous
period con￿ icts are no longer statistically signi￿cant. Furthermore, as the results in Model
4 suggests, exports now seem to matter in reducing the likelihood of con￿ icts only at very
high levels of exporting.
The results from this study concur with existing evidence in the literature in two
main respects - Firstly, using ￿ve-year period averages (Models 3 & 4), the ￿ndings does
suggest concavity in the relationship between exports (or betterstill, export revenues)
and con￿ ict, as upheld in Collier et al (2006). However, unlike in Collier et al (2006),
the coe¢ cient on EXP(t ￿ 1) is statistically insigni￿cant whereas that on EXP 2(t ￿ 1)
is statistically signi￿cant, suggesting that, only at higher levels of exporting does the
likelihood of con￿ icts reduce. Nonetheless, the "resource curse" phenomenon can not be
completely ruled out, given the consistently positive and economically important (though
statistically insigni￿cant) coe¢ cient on the natural resource dummy (RES_DUMMY).
Finally, one of the most nuanced implications of the study is the evidence that rising
per capita income for the low income countries increases the likelihood of con￿ icts, which
suggests further that, poverty may not be the main driver of internal con￿ icts in African
states. This view point is consistent with emerging rational choice models of con￿ icts
21and Krueger & Maleckova (2003) who recently concluded that "any connection between
poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak".
5 Conclusion
The main endeavour of this study has been to investigate whether increasing school ed-
ucation reduces the likelihood of societal con￿ icts in Africa. The study employed both
annualised data and ￿ve-year period averages of all variables during 1960-2000 in a sam-
ple of 31 African countries and using a random-e⁄ects probit as well as the multinomial
logistic estimator in a panel data framework. Using an aggregated measure of all intra-
state major episodes of political violence obtained from the Political Instability Task
Force (PITF) dataset as proxy for con￿ ict, and the average schooling years in the pop-
ulation aged 15 and above, as proxy for school education, and controlling for the extent
of political participation, income inequality, labour market conditions, ethno-linguistic &
religious fractionalisation, neighborhood e⁄ects, per capita income levels, natural resource
revenues, youth bulge, in￿ ation, and urbanisation; the results suggests that education ef-
fectively reduces the likelihood of intra-state con￿ icts in Africa. This ￿nding is robust to
alternative model speci￿cations and to alternative time frames of analysis.
The evidence also suggests that, sound macroeconomic policies, by way of rapid per
capita GDP growth, better export performance and lower in￿ ation are means of e⁄ectively
reducing the likelihood of con￿ icts while neighborhood e⁄ects are a signi￿cant driver of
internal con￿ icts in African states. Therefore, in the battle to reduce the frequency
of intra-state con￿ icts, African governments should complement investments in education
with sound macroeconomic policies while seeking mutually bene￿cial solutions to all major
internal con￿ icts, with a view to minimising their spill-over e⁄ects.
A ￿nal word would be that, this study has attempted to throw some light into the
vast, albeit emerging ￿eld of con￿ ict and education but there is evidently so much that
is left uncovered. Future work might consider extending the time frame of analysis to
include more recent episodes of con￿ icts in Africa, investigating into the likely mechanisms
of transmission between education and con￿ ict, as well as, incorporating the intensity
dimension of con￿ icts which was ignored in the present study. Finally, for a comprehensive
understanding of the drivers of intra-state con￿ ict, further research might consider moving
away from the cross-country to the country-speci￿c framework.
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